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Abstract
Model checking is a well known technique for the veriﬁcation of ﬁnite state models using temporal logic
speciﬁcation. While model checking is suitable for transformational systems (also called closed systems), it is
unsuitable for open systems (also known as reactive systems) where the nondeterminism in the environment
must be considered during veriﬁcation. Module checking is an approach for the veriﬁcation of open systems
which have both closed (internal) and open (environment or external) states. It has been demonstrated
in [10] that the complexity of module checking branching time logic CTL is EXPTIME-complete. The
approach to module checking is global and the method tries to establish that the property in question holds
over all possible environments.
This papers develops a local approach to CTL module checking using tableau rules. The proposed approach
tries to determine a single environment under which the negation of the property is satisﬁed over the given
module. Such a strategy, thus, leads to a local approach to module checking where we only explore states
that are relevant to proving that the negation of the property can be satisﬁed over the given module using
an appropriate witness (environment) that the algorithm also generates. While the worst case complexity
of our algorithm is identical to the earlier complexity, we demonstrate that practical implementation of the
proposed approach is feasible and yields much better results than the global approach.
Keywords: module checking, open systems, tableau based veriﬁcation
1 Introduction
Reactive systems [7,13] are open systems that continuously interact with their en-
vironment while executing a non-terminating control program. Examples include
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operating systems, communication protocols, missile and avionics systems and con-
trollers for nuclear plants and simple home appliances such as microwaves, DVD
players and washing machines. Such applications require careful analysis, design
and validation techniques as they can often be safety critical. Hence, formal tech-
niques have often been used in the design, development and validation of these
systems [16,11,5,6,3,12,15]. Formal techniques use precise syntax and semantics
for deﬁning speciﬁcations and models of systems so that rigorous veriﬁcation of
properties such as correctness, reliability and security is made possible.
With the advent and widespread use of embedded systems, which are ubiquitous
reactive computing systems ranging from simple home appliances to very complex
applications in avionics and defense, the need for formal methods in the design of
reactive systems is growing. One very common approach to veriﬁcation of reac-
tive systems has been model checking. A model checker takes a formula in some
temporal logic [14] as a desirable property and performs formal analysis over a ﬁnite-
state model of a system (called a Kripke structure [3], a special class of ﬁnite state
machines). The model checking process is essentially an automated reachability
analysis task over the ﬁnite state model of the system. This task either terminates
with a proof that the temporal property holds over the model or on failure generates
a counter example.
The model checker, during the reachability analysis phase, assumes that all
transitions out of any given state of a model is eventually enabled. This assumption
is based on the fact that the model is considered to be closed i.e., all states of
the system are purely internal and that it is the system that gets to choose which
transition to take based on some internal computation. This approach to analysis,
while being suitable for transformational systems which are closed, are unsuitable
for reactive systems that are open.
An open system maintains an ongoing interaction with its environment. Hence,
the state-space of such a system may be partitioned into a set of states that are open
(also called external or environment states) and another set of states that are closed
(also called internal or system states) [8,9]. An environment state reacts to events
in the external environment of the open system and the environment is considered
asynchronous and uncontrollable. A system state, on the other hand, takes no
inputs from the external environment and the system automatically chooses one of
the transitions based on some internal decision (such as say the value of a variable or
the result returned by a function). Kupferman et al. have recently shown that model
checking may not be enough for open systems due to the presence of environment
states and when branching formulas are considered in the speciﬁcation [9]. The
proposed technique, called module checking, takes the asynchronous environment
into account while doing a proof for branching-time logics. [6,5] further discuss
techniques devoted to issues concerning veriﬁcation of open systems.
This paper illustrates the need for module checking reactive systems and pro-
poses an alternate approach to module checking that has eﬃcient implementation
avenues compared to the original approach. We ﬁrst illustrate the need for module
checking followed by our approach to local module checking.
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1.1 Motivating Example - The Coﬀee Brewer Veriﬁcation Problem
Consider a simple coﬀee brewer model as depicted in the Figure 1. In this ﬁgure,
environment states are shown using elipses whereas system states are drawn as
circles. Each transition out of any state is marked by a natural number starting
with 1. The brewer serves either ﬁve or ten cups of coﬀee in either medium or strong
ﬂavor. A user can select the number of cups of coﬀee (using a switch as an input)
and the strength of coﬀee (using another switch). The brewer is normally in the oﬀ
state until the switched on. Hence, the initial state labeled by the proposition OFF
is an environment state. Once the brewer is switched on, it enters a state labeled by
the proposition CHOOSE. This is again an environment state. In this state, the
user can select the number of cups of coﬀee and the strength of coﬀee. Depending
on the selection (two switches lead to four diﬀerent possibilities), the brewer enters
any one of the following states: (five,medium), (five, strong), (ten,medium) or
(ten, strong). Once the selections have been made and the corresponding state has
been reached, the brew cycle switch has to be switched on to start the brewing.
Hence all the above four states are also environment states. Once the brew cycle
is set, the brewer makes a transition to a state labeled BREW . This state is a
system state since no inputs from the environment is required to make progress.
From the BREW state, the brewer makes an automatic transition to the DONE
state after a predetermined time period (which is the amount of time taken by the
brewing process). The state labeled DONE is also a system state since the brewer
takes one of two possible branches based on some internal condition. If any error
is detected (say not enough coﬀee or no milk power), then a transition is made to
an error state (labeled by ERROR). Alternatively, the brewer can reach a state
labeled SERV E where the actual coﬀee selected is served.
CTL is a branching time temporal logic that has been shown to be quite eﬃcient
for model checking. Let us consider the following CTL property:
AGEF (TEN ∧ AF (SERV E ∨ERROR)) which demands that from any state
one can possibly eventually select ten cups of coﬀee and once selected, ten cups will
always be served (or an error encountered) in the future.
Note that a model checker will always return a true answer for this question.
However, consider the following situation. Due to cost cutting in the work place
where the brewer is installed, brewing ten cups of coﬀee at a time is not allowed (this
has been enforced through a circular and the ten cups switch is masked). Hence,
no user will be allowed to make this selection from the CHOOSE state. Thus, it
will not be possible to guarantee the selection of ten cups of coﬀee and hence the
property fails to hold over the coﬀee brewer model. This property could also be
violated if all users request ﬁve cups of coﬀee or tea (and no users request ten cups
of any beverage). In this case, even though the machine is capable of dispensing
ten cups of tea or coﬀee, the environment in which it operates eﬀectively disables
it from doing that.
This property illustrates that due to the presence of environment states, it may
not be always possible to satisfy branching time temporal properties. As the envi-
ronment of an open system is asynchronous and hence uncontrollable, the environ-
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Fig. 1. The coﬀee brewer example
ment may never enable some desired transitions leading to failure of the property.
This example thus motivates the module checking problem: how do we ensure that
a given property holds over a known module (a model with environment and system
states) assuming an uncertain environment. The basic idea in module checking is
to prove that the property holds over all possible choices made in the environment
states. In other words, the module checking problem is to decide if a CTL formula
ϕ holds over a moduleM provided for all possible environments E such thatM×E
satisfy ϕ. Here, M×E denotes the composition of the model and the environment
running in parallel (to be formalized later).
This may be expressed as follows: module checking, denoted by M |=o ϕ, there-
fore, amounts to deciding whether ∀E .M×E |= ϕ; i.e.
M |=o ϕ⇔ ∀E .M×E |= ϕ (1)
It has been shown in Kupferman et al. [10] that the module checking problem for
the temporal logic CTL is EXPTIME-complete unlike the polynomial complexity
for the model checking problem. The reason for this complexity may be intuitively
seen from the above equation since the proof has to be carried out for all possi-
ble environments. This is unlike model checking, where the system is closed and
hence the reachability proof proceeds without considering any nondeterminism in
the environment.
While this sounds like bad news, a practical implementation of module checking
is possible by the following observation.
Proceeding further, from Equation 1 we state that
M |=o ϕ ⇔ ∃E
′.(M×E ′ |= ϕ⇔M×E ′ |= ¬ϕ) (2)
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In the above, the negation on ϕ can be pushed inside the formula such that all tem-
poral and boolean operators are free from negation. Furthermore as the existence
of E ′ ensures thatM |=o ϕ, E ′ acts as a witness to the violation. Such a witness can
be used to provide useful insights to the reason for violation of a desired property
over an open systems. The main beauty of this procedure is that we are looking for
only one environment using which we can prove that the formula is not satisﬁed.
We will illustrate later that we can employ a set of tableau rules to perform the
computation of E ′ locally. This local computation is similar to on-the-ﬂy model
checking [1] where the state space of the system under veriﬁcation is constructed
on a need-driven basis. Even though the worst case complexity of local module
checking is still bounded by the results of [10], we demonstrate that the proposed
approach to local module checking yields much better practical results. The main
contributions of this paper are:
(i) We propose a set of sound and complete tableau rules for local module checking.
The proposed approach determines a single witness (environment) so that un-
der the witness the negation of the given CTL property is satisﬁed. The proof
proceeds only along a local set of states that are needed for the generation of
a witness.
(ii) We have developed a local module checker by extending NuSMV [2]. Local
module checking has been compared with the generation of the maximal envi-
ronment under which the given CTL property is satisﬁed to demonstrate the
performance gain of the proposed approach. The benchmarks are examples
from NuSMV with both environment and system states.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents fundamental
theory. Section 3 formulates CTL local module checking and presents the tableau
rules for both system and environment states. Section 4 describes the implementa-
tion of a local module checker and section 5 contains the results obtained from it.
Concluding remarks follow in section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Kripke Structure.
System behavior is described using Kripke structure M = (S, s0,→, P, L), where
S is the set of states, s0 ∈ S is the start state, →⊆ S × S is the set of transition
relations, P is the set of propositions relevant to M and ﬁnally, L : S → 2P is the
labeling function mapping each state to set of propositions.
Temporal logic: CTL.
Properties of the system are deﬁned using branching time temporal logic CTL.
A CTL formula is deﬁned over a set of propositions using temporal and boolean
operators as follows:
φ→ P | ¬P | tt | ﬀ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | AXφ | EXφ | A(φUφ) | E(φUφ) | AGφ | EGφ
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Note that CTL in general allows negations on temporal and boolean operators.
However, we restrict ourselves to verifying CTL formulas where negations can only
be applied to propositions.
Semantics of CTL formula, ϕ denoted by [[ϕ]]M is given in terms of set of states
in Kripke structure, M , which satisﬁes the formula. See Fig. 2.
[[p]]M={s | p ∈ L(s)}
[[¬p]]M={s | p ∈ L(s)}
[[tt]]M=S
[[ﬀ]]M=Φ
[[ϕ ∧ ψ]]M=[[ϕ]]M ∩ [[ψ]]M
[[ϕ ∨ ψ]]M=[[ϕ]]M ∪ [[ψ]]M
[[AXϕ]]M={s|∀s→ s
′ ∧ s′ ∈ [[ϕ]]M}
[[EXϕ]]M={s|∃s→ s
′ ∧ s′ ∈ [[ϕ]]M}
[[A(ϕUψ)]]M={s|∀s = s1 → s2 → . . . ∧ ∃i, j.sj |= ψ ∧ ∀i < j.si |= ϕ}
[[E(ϕUψ)]]M={s|∃s = s1 → s2 → . . . ∧ ∃i, j.sj |= ψ ∧ ∀i < j.si |= ϕ}
[[AGϕ]]M={s|∀s = s1 → s2 → . . . ∧ ∀i.si |= ϕ}
[[EGϕ]]M={s|∃s = s1 → s2 → . . . ∧ ∀i.si |= ϕ}
Fig. 2. Semantics of CTL
A state s ∈ S is said to satisfy a CTL formula ϕ, denoted by M,s |= ϕ, if
s ∈ [[ϕ]]M . We will omit M from |= relation and [[]] if the model is evident in the
context. We will also say that M |= ϕ iﬀ M,s0 |= ϕ. The complexity for model
checking M against a CTL formula ϕ is O(|M | × |ϕ|) where |M | and |ϕ| are size of
the model and the formula respectively.
Module Checking. [8]
In contrast to model checking where all transitions in every state of the model
are always enabled, module checking is speciﬁcally directed for veriﬁcation of models
of open systems with states where the environment decides which transitions are
enabled. Typically, in models of open systems, modules in short, the states are
partitioned into two sets Ss and Se where Ss consists of system states with all
outgoing transitions enabled while Se is the set of environment-controlled states
where some (at least one) transitions are enabled. Note that, the environment can
enable one or more transitions but cannot disable all transitions.
[10] presents the complexities for module checking in the setting of diﬀerent
temporal logic. While LTL module checking problem has the same complexity as
LTL model checking, module checking branching-time temporal logics (CTL, CTL*)
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is harder compared to corresponding model checking. It has been proved that the
problem of module checking is EXPTIME-Complete for CTL and 2EXPTIME-
complete for CTL* speciﬁcations.
3 Tableau-based CTL Module Checking
In this paper, we present a technique for module checking CTL speciﬁcations such
that the state-space of the module is explored locally and on-the-ﬂy, i.e. our tech-
nique only explores the states needed to (dis)satisfy a given CTL formula.
We consider the behavior of a module M in the context of an environment
E such that at each system state of M, the environment is incapable of altering
the behavior of the module while at each environment state, the environment can
decide which transitions to enable. To address such restrictions on the interaction,
the behavioral patterns of M and E are described using labeled Kripke structure
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Labeled Kripke Structure] A labeled Kripke structure LKS =
(S, s0,→, P, L,K) where S, s0, P, L are deﬁned as before, K is the maximum out-
going branching factor of states in S and →⊆ S × {1, 2, . . . , n} × S with n ≤ K.
The state set S of a module may be partitioned into two subsets, Se, the set of all
environment states and Ss, the set of all system states. In the above, each transition
is annotated by a branching identiﬁer whose domain is equal to the maximum
branching factor. We will write s
i
→ s′ to denote the i-th out-going transition from
s if (s, i, s′) ∈→.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Parallel Composition] Given a module M = (SM, s0M,→M
, PM, LM,K), its environment E = (SE , s0E ,→E , PE , LE ,K), their parallel compo-
sition resulting in M×E ≡ P = (SP , s0P ,→P , PP , LP ,K) are deﬁned as follows
(i) SP ⊆ SM × SE
(ii) s0P = (s
0
M, s
0
E)
(iii) PP = PM ∪ PE
(iv) LP(s1, s2) = LM(s1) ∪ LE(s2) where s1 ∈ SM and s2 ∈ SE
(v) (s1, s2)
i
→P (s′1, s
′
2) if s1
i
→M s′1 and s2
i
→E s′2 where s1, s
′
1 ∈ SM and s2, s
′
2 ∈
SE
Furthermore, following constraints are imposed to restrict E
(a) System-state conformity. if s1 is a system state then ∀s1
i
→M s′1 ⇒ ∃s2
i
→E
s′2 and vice versa.
(b) Environment-controllability. if s1 is an environment-controlled state then
∃s2
i
→E s′2 ∧ (∀s2
j
→E s′′2 ⇒ ∃s1
j
→M s′′1)
Given a CTL formula ϕ, we say that M× E ≡ P |= ϕ ⇔ s0P |= ϕ. Module
checking, denoted byM |=o ϕ, therefore, amounts to deciding whether ∀E .M×E |=
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reorg
ss|e |= {ϕ1,...,ϕn}
ss|e |= ϕ1 ... ss|e |= ϕn
prop
ss|e |= p
.
p ∈ L(ss) ∧
ss|e |= ϕ1∧ϕ2
ss|e |= ϕ1 ss|e |= ϕ2
∨1
ss|e |= ϕ1∨ϕ2
ss|e |= ϕ1 ∨2
ss|e |= ϕ1∨ϕ2
ss|e |= ϕ2
unreu
ss|e |= E(ϕUψ)
ss|e |= ψ∨(ϕ∧EXE(ϕUψ)) unrau
ss|e |= A(ϕUψ)
ss|e |= ψ∨(ϕ∧AXA(ϕUψ))
unreg
ss|e |= EGϕ
ss|e |= ϕ∧EXEGϕ unrag
ss|e |= AGϕ
ss|e |= ϕ∧AXAGϕ
unrss,ex
ss|e |= EXϕ
si|ei |= ϕ, sj |ej |=tt...sk|ek |=tt
⎧⎨
⎩
si ∈ NS = {sI |s
I
→M sI}, sj,...,k ∈ NS − {si}
ei,j,...,k ∈ NSe = {eI |e
I
→E eI}
unrss,ax
ss|e |= AXϕ
s1|e1 |= ϕ ... sk|ek |= ϕ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k.ss
i
→M si ∧ e
i
→E ei
Fig. 3. Tableau Rules for Module Checking System States
ϕ; i.e.
M |=o ϕ⇔ ∀E .M×E |= ϕ (3)
Proceeding further, from Equation 3 we state that
M |=o ϕ ⇔ ∃E
′.(M×E ′ |= ϕ⇔M×E ′ |= ¬ϕ) (4)
It is important to note however thatM |=o ϕ ⇒ M |=o ¬ϕ. It can be shown that
a module does not satisfy both a formula and its negation 4 . A module might satisfy
a formula and its negation under diﬀerent environments. For example: given M =
({s0, s1, s2}, s0, {s0
1
→ s1, s0
2
→ s2, s1
1
→ s1, s2
1
→ s2}, {p}, L, 2}) where L(s1) = {p}
and CTL formula AXp, it is easy to see that M |=o AXp and M |=o EX¬p.
3.1 Local Module Checking and Generation of Witness
We present here a tableau-based technique similar to [4] for constructing the witness
environment E , existence of which ensures that the module does not satisfy original
formula. Tableau rules are deﬁned as
Antecedent
Consequent
where the Antecedent represents the current obligation for module checking and
Consequent denotes the next obligation. A successful tableau (see below) will result
in automatic generation of the environment E . Figs. 3 and 4 present the complete
tableau where the former corresponds to the rules for system states and the latter
for the environment-controlled states.
4 Note that the same is not true for model checking problem: M |= ϕ ⇔ M |= ¬ϕ
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reorg
se|e |= ϕ
se|e |= {ϕ}
emp
se|e |={}
.
prop
se|e |= {p,C}
se|e |= C p ∈ L(se)
∧ se|e |= {ϕ1∧ϕ2,C}
se|e |= {ϕ1,ϕ2,C} ∨1
se|e |= {ϕ1∨ϕ2,C}
se|e |= {ϕ1,C} ∨1
se|e |= {ϕ1∨ϕ2,C}
se|e |= {ϕ2,C}
unreu
se|e |= {E(ϕUψ),C}
se|e |= {(ψ∨(ϕ∧EXE(ϕUψ))),C} unrau
se|e |= {A(ϕUψ),C}
se|e |= {(ψ∨(ϕ∧AXA(ϕUψ))),C}
unreg
se|e |= {EGϕ,C}
se|e |= {ϕ∧EXEGϕ,C} unrag
se|e |= {AGϕ,C}
se|e |= {ϕ∧AXAGϕ,C}
unrse
se|e |= C
∃π⊆Π. ∃ΠCex (π). ∀i∈π. si|ei|=Cax∪Ci
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Cax =
⋃
AXϕk∈C ϕk
Cex =
⋃
EXϕl∈C ϕl
Π = {i | se
i
→M si}
ΠCex(π) = {Ci | i ∈ π ⊆ Π ∧ Ci ⊆ Cex}
Cex =
⋃
i:Ci∈ΠCex (π) Ci⋂
i:Ci∈ΠCex (π) Ci = Φ
Fig. 4. Tableau Rules for Module Checking Environment States
Tableau for System States. Consider ﬁrst the Fig. 3 (without the reorg rule). The
rules for prop, ∧, ∨s are simple and intuitive. The prop rule leads to a successful
tableau leaf, the ∧ rule is successful if both its consequents are successful and ﬁnally,
the success of ∨-rule depends on the success of any of its consequents. The rule
unreu corresponds to unrolling of the EU formula expression. A state satisﬁes
E(ϕUψ) iﬀ (a) ψ is satisﬁed in the current state or (b) ϕ is true in the current state
and in one of its next states E(ϕUψ) is satisﬁed. The rule for unrau is similar to
unreu with exception of the presence of universal quantiﬁcation on the next states
(AX). The rule unreg (unrag) states that the current state satisﬁes ϕ and in some
(all) next state EGϕ (AGϕ) holds true.
Finally, the rules for unrss,ex and unrss,ax correspond to the unfolding of the
state and the formula expression simultaneously. Note that in the former, we are
searching for at least one next state, while in the latter all next states should satisfy
ϕ. As such for the EX-formula expression, the tableau selects any one of the next
states si|ei and if the selected state satisﬁes ϕ, there is no obligation left for the rest
of the next states; the obligations on the remaining next states sj,...,k in the context
of the environment is to satisfy tt 5 (any state satisﬁes the propositional constant
tt). Note that, the tableau can potentially have k sub-tableaus for unrss,ex each of
which will correspond to selection of one next state si from the set of k next states
5 For the purpose of constructing the environment, in Rule unrss,ex, we can safely assume that all the
environment states ej...,k replicates the behavioral patterns of module states sj...,k.
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of ss.
Observe that, the rules unrss,ex, unrss,ax lead to one-step construction of the
environment. Conforming to the constraint that the environment at the system
state cannot control the enabled transition, the environment must have exactly the
same number of transitions as the system state.
Tableau for Environment-Controlled States. The tableau rules (Fig. 4) for environ-
ment controlled states are slightly diﬀerent from the one described above. Instead of
asking whether a state satisﬁes a formula expression (see Fig. 3), the question asked
is whether a state satisﬁes a set of formula expressions. In fact the set represents
a formula expression equivalent to conjunction over its elements. The reason for
altering the tableau rule structure stems from the fact the environment plays an ac-
tive role in deciding the enabled transitions. For example: in order to construct an
environment state e such that se|e |= ϕ∧ψ, we need to construct e1 and e2 such that
se|e1 |= ϕ and se|e2 |= ψ with the constraint that e1 = e2, i.e. exactly the same set
of transitions is enabled to module check ϕ and ψ at the state se. To address to this
state of aﬀairs, the tableau rules for environment-controlled state maintains a global
view of all the formula to be satisﬁed and ensures consistent enabling/disabling of
transitions by the environment (to be constructed).
The rules for prop,∨, unreu, unrau, unreg, unrag in Fig. 4 are similar to that
in Fig. 3. The rule for ∧ aggregates all the conjuncts in the set. The emp-rule
represents the case the state does not have obligation to satisfy any formula and a
(successful) tableau leaf is reached. The rule unrse is applied only when no other
rules are applicable. In other words, the set C only contains EX and/or AX formula
expressions. Cax is the set of all formula expressions that must be satisﬁed in all
next states while Cex is the set of the formula expressions each of which must be
satisﬁed in at least one of the next states. Π records all the indices of the outgoing
transitions from se, while ΠCex(π) is a subset of Cex such that there is at least one
subset for each i present in a subset π ∈ Π. For example, if π is a singleton set, then
ΠCex(π) is also a singleton set containing Cex. In short, ΠCex(π) is used to associate
with i-th selection of next state-environment pair a set of elements Ci ⊆ Cex. The
consequent of the rule, therefore, ﬁres the obligation that all states identiﬁed by the
indices in π must satisfy Cax and the corresponding subset of Cex as identiﬁed by
ΠCex(π).
This rule is illustrated by Fig. 5. All states in the Fig. 5(a) are environment
states and the proposition p is true at states s1, s4, and s6. The obligation at s0|e0
is to satisfy C = {AXEXp,EXEX¬p,EXp}. As there are 3 transitions from s0
there are 23−1 = 7 diﬀerent choices for π. Fig. 5(b) shows subsets consisting of only
1 and 2. π represents the indices of enabled transitions. These transitions lead to
states which must satisfy all the elements of Cax = {EXp}. Corresponding to each
π, there exists at least one choice for ΠCex(π) which subsets Cex = {p,EX¬p} in |π|
subsets where |π| is the size of π. It also assigns each subset to diﬀerent subset of
next states where elements of the assigned subset must be satisﬁed. For example for
π = {1, 2}, there are two possible ways of assigning subsets of Cex to s1|e1 and s2|e2
(see Fig. 5(b)). In this example, we obtain an environment e0 for π = {1, 2} (i.e.
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1S0
S1 S2 S3
S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
p
p p
1 2 3
1 2 1 2
Antecedent: s0|e0 |= C Cax = {EXp}, Cex = {p,EX¬p}
π ΠCex(π)
Consequent
si|ei |= Cax ∪ Ci
{1} {Cex} s1|e1 |= {EXp,EX¬p, p}
{2} {Cex} s1|e1 |= {EXp,EX¬p, p}
{1,2}
{{p},{EX¬p}} √ s1|e1 |= {EXp, p}
s2|e2 |= {EXp,EX¬p}
{{EX¬p},{p}} s1|e1 |= {EXp,EX¬p}
s2|e2 |= {EXp, p}
...
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Illustration of unrse tableau rule
the transition labeled 3 from s0 is disabled), and ΠCex(π) = {{p}, {EX¬p}}. Note
that, our local approach does not necessarily examine all possible choices for π and
the corresponding subsets ΠCex(π); instead it terminates as soon as an environment
that leads to satisﬁability of given formula is obtained.
Finally, consider the reorg (re-organize) rules in Figures 3 and 4. These rules
rearrang the formula obligations from set-based to expression-based or vice versa
depending on the type of the model state being considered.
Finitizing the Tableau. The given tableau rules can be of inﬁnite depth as each
recursive formula expressions AU,EU,AG,EG are unfolded inﬁnitely many times.
However, the total number of states in the Kripke structure for the module is
N = |S|, and this ﬁnitizes the tableau depth. In Fig. 3, if the pair (ss, ϕ) in
ss|e |= ϕ, where ϕ is either EG or AG formula expression, appears twice in a
tableau path, we fold back the tableau by pointing the second occurrence to the
ﬁrst and stating a successful tableau loop is obtained. Note that this also leads to
generation of a loop in the constructed environment. On the other hand, if the pair
(ss, ϕ), where ϕ is of the form EU or AU , appears twice, the second occurrence is
classiﬁed as an unsuccessful tableau leaf and is replaced by ﬀ.
The idea of folding back or replacing using false relies on ﬁxed point semantics
of CTL formulas. The CTL formulas EG and AG can be represented by greatest
ﬁxed point recursive equations:
EGϕ ≡ Z =ν ϕ ∧EXZ AGϕ ≡ Z =ν ϕ ∧AXZ
In the above ν represents the sign of the equation and is used to denote greatest
ﬁxed point and Z is recursive variable whose valuation/semantics (set of model
states) is the greatest ﬁxed point computation of its deﬁnition. Similarly the ﬁxed
point representation of CTL formulas AU and EU are
E(ϕUψ) ≡ Z =μ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ EXZ) A(ϕUψ) ≡ Z =μ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧AXZ)
The ﬁxed point computation proceeds by iteratively computing the approxima-
tions of Z over the lattice of set of states in the model. A solution is reached only
when two consecutive approximations are identical. For greatest ﬁxed point com-
putation, the ﬁrst approximation is the set of the all states (top of the lattice) and
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as such a system can satisfy a greatest ﬁxed point formula along an inﬁnite path
(using loops). On the other hand, the ﬁrst approximation of the least ﬁxed point
variable is empty set (bottom of the lattice) and therefore satisﬁable paths for least
ﬁxed point formula are always of ﬁnite length.
For the tableau in Fig. 4, the ﬁnitization condition is similar. If the pair (se, C)
in se|e |= C, appears twice in a tableau path and if C contains any least ﬁxed point
CTL formula expression, then the second occurrence is replaced by ﬀ ; otherwise the
second occurrence is made to point to the ﬁrst and a successful tableau is obtained.
Theorem 3.3 (Sound and Complete) Given a module M and CTL formula ϕ,
M |=o ϕ, iﬀ the tableau in Figures 3 and 4 generates an environment E where
M×E |= ¬ϕ.
Proof. The proof proceeds by realizing the soundness and completeness of each of
the tableau rules. For brevity, we present here the proof-sketch for unrse , proofs for
the other rules are straightforward.
Recall that, se|e |= C, where C is the set of formula expressions with temporal
operators AX and EX, is satisﬁable if the next states proof obligations are satisﬁed
by destination states reachable via transitions enabled by the environment e. The
environment can enable any subset (barring ∅) of transitions. The tableau rule,
therefore, considers all possible subset of destination states of enabled transitions.
As each transition is annotated by an index (whose domain is over the out-going
branching factor of se), we construct Π, the set of indices of out-going transitions.
In other words, i ∈ Π ⇒ si is reachable via the transition with index i. We are
required to identify one possible subset of Π which represents the enabled transitions
whose destinations conform to the satisﬁability obligations in the consequent (see
∃π ⊆ Π in the consequent). Let πs = {si | i ∈ π} be the next states reachable via
(selected) enabled transitions.
The consequent of the tableau rule has the following obligations. All elements of
πs in parallel composition with the environment must satisfy the expressions in Cax
and for each formula expression ϕ in Cex, there must be at least one state which in
conjunction with the corresponding environment satisﬁes ϕ. Observe that, there is
requirement for an existence of a subset, ΠCex(π), of Cex corresponding to a subset
π such that next state-environment pairs satisfy the corresponding obligations. This
ensures that the environment constructed is consistent, i.e., ei is constructed such
that si|ei satisﬁes both the for all obligations (Cax) and its share of existential
obligations (Ci). Therefore, if we can generate an environment for se corresponding
to rule unrse , then se |=o ψ where ψ is the disjunction of the elements of the set
{AX¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ Cex} ∪ {EX¬ψ | ψ ∈ Cax}. The other direction can be proved
likewise. 
Complexity.
The main factor in complexity is attributed to the handling of universal and
existential formulas in unrse rule in Fig. 4. The number of diﬀerent obligations that
can be ﬁred on the basis of each selection of π ⊆ Π, is O(2|Cex|×|π|) where |Cex|
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Fig. 6. The witness environment for the coﬀee brewer example
and |π| are respectively the size of the respective sets. This is because we need to
consider all possible permutations of elements of Cex and match the permutations
with all possible permutations for selecting element from π. Overall complexity is,
therefore, exponential to the maximum branching factor (maximum size of π) of
the module times the size of the formula to be satisﬁed. It is worth noting here
that if the given formula is free from EX and EU , the complexity of tableau-based
approach will be polynomial to the sizes of the formula and module (same as model
checking). This is due to the fact that in the presence of only AX-formulas in rule
unrse , we are only required to ﬁnd one element from Π; the state corresponding to
which satisﬁes Cax.
Figure 6 shows the witness environment generated for the coﬀee brewer in Fig-
ure 1. The witness environment disables three transitions of state s1 such that there
is no path where ten cups can be selected. Under this witness, it can be shown that
the model does not satisfy the original property AGE(tt U TEN ∧AF (SERV E ∨
ERROR)).
4 Implementation
A local module checking tool has been implemented using C/C++ and many SMV
benchmarks from the NuSMV package have been tested. The tool proceeds as
follows:
(i) An SMV model is converted into an explicit state FSM using NuSMV. This
is achieved by traversing the model’s state space in NuSMV and writing all
reachability information (states, transitions and labels) to a ﬁle. As there is no
explicit notion of system/environment states in NuSMV, the state space is di-
vided randomly into two sets of equal size representing system and environment
states respectively.
(ii) The ﬁle containing the explicit state FSM is read by the tool along with the
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CTL property to be used for veriﬁcation.
(iii) The CTL property is negated and the negation is carried inwards. CTL prop-
erties can not have negations applied to formulas other than propositions.
(iv) A search for a witness is carried out, starting with the initial state, and the
tool attempts to generate an environment under which the module satisﬁes
the negated CTL property. If a witness is present, then the module does not
satisfy the original property.
The algorithm applies the appropriate system or environment state tableau rules
on the current state. Once all present (current-state) commitments are met, any
future commitments are passed to its successors. It uses a heuristic to compute a
small set of successors of the current state which satisfy all its future commitments.
This is used to ensure that the generated witness is small. If no witness can be
computed, it can be concluded that the module satisﬁes the CTL property. Note
that the algorithm attempts to generate a small witness and not the minimal witness
for a given property and module. In order to compare the obtained results, the tool
was extended to ﬁnd an environment under which the original CTL property is
satisﬁed. This is achieved as follows:
(i) The CTL property (non-negated) is read along with the module FSM (as
above).
(ii) The algorithm attempts to ﬁnd an environment under which the given CTL
property is satisﬁed by traversing all of the reachable state space.
It is important to note here that the above is not an implementation of global
module checking. Global module checking advocates the need to check if the given
property is satisﬁed by the module under all environments. However, the above
approach constructs only a single environment under which the given CTL property
is satisﬁed by the module. However, unlike the local module checker which attempts
to generate a small witness, the algorithm for global module checking constructs
the biggest environment under which the module satisﬁes the given property. This
is done by enabling all but those transitions in reachable environment states which
may lead to the dissatisfaction of the given property. It was observed that on
the average, computing the maximal environment under which the original CTL
property is satisﬁed consumes more time than computing a small witness under
which it fails.
The problem of computing all possible environments (global module checking)
is even more harder and time consuming and the beneﬁts of local module checking
will be even more apparent in such a case.
5 Experimental Results
The results are given in table 1. The ﬁrst column contains the name and size (in
number of states) of the veriﬁed module and the CTL property used is given in the
second column. The results obtained from local module checking are presented in
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System(|S|) CTL Property Local module Generation
checking of maxi-
mal witness
short(4) AG(request− > AFstate = busy) 0.02/F/0 (2) 0.05/S/0
ring(7) (AGAFgate1.output) ∧ (AGAF !gate1.output) 0.01/F/0 (2) 0.02/S/0
Counter(8) AG(bit2.value = 0) 0.00/S/0 (5) 0/F/0
coﬀee(10) AGAF (ten ∧ EFServe) 0.0084/S/3 (7) 0.001/S/0
MCP(30) AGEF ((MCP.missionaries = 0)∧ 0.001/S/5 (2) 0.05/S/0
(MCP.cannibals = 0))
base(1758) trueAU(step = 0) 1.250/F/0 (21) 1.290/S/0
periodic(3952) AG(aux = p11) 9.580/S/0 (701) 51.270/F/0
syncarb5(5120) AGEFe5.P ersistent 7.73/S/0 (223) 3704/S/960
dme1(6654) AG(( e− 1.r.out = 1| e− 2.r.out = 1) 5.490/F/0 (141) 41.17/S/790
∧( e− 1.r.out = 1| e− 3.r.out = 1)
∧( e− 2.r.out = 1| e− 3.r.out = 1))
pqueue(10000) EG(out l[1] = 0) 34.20/F/0 (1904) 35.130/S/0
pqueue(10000) AF (out l[1] = 0) 34.930/F/0 (2101) 34.960/S/0
barrel(45025) AGtrueAU( b0 = 0) 12.720/S/0 (231) 34.190/S/1
idle(87415) trueAU(step = 0) 77.190/F/0 (38088) 79.920/S/0
abp4(275753) EF (sender.state = get) 130.77/F/0 (59808) 133.880/S/0
Table 1
Implementation Results
the third column. The fourth column contains the results of generating the maximal
environment under which the given CTL property is satisﬁed 6 .
Note that for many modules, the original property and its negation were both
satisﬁed under diﬀerent environments. A majority of models had multiple start
states. In these cases, the local module checker (and the maximal witness generater)
was executed on each start state. Models with dense transition relations such as
dme1 and syncarb5 took signiﬁcantly more time. Models with relatively sparse
transitions relations such as abp4 and idle took lesser time even though they had
a higher number of reachable states. The local module checker took slightly longer
when the original CTL formula was satisﬁed by the module (abp4, pqueue, periodic).
6 Conclusions
Module checking extends model checking for open systems. It has been shown
in [10] that the complexity of module checking for branching time logic CTL is
EXPTIME complete. The above approach to module checking generates all possible
environments so that the composition of the model and the environment satisﬁes
the CTL property. In this paper we propose a local approach to CTL module
checking. The proposed approach tries to determine a witness environment so that
the negation of the property is satisﬁed by the composition of the witness and
the model. When this is possible, the original property is not satisﬁed over the
module. We have developed a set of sound and complete tableau rules for local
6 The results are in format TimeTaken(seconds)/Result(SUCCESS or FAILURE)/Number of disablings
(Number of states traversed locally during local module checking).
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module checking of CTL. The eﬃciency of the proposed approach is demonstrated
by comparing the performance of local and traditional global module checking using
benchmarks from NuSMV. The results presented compare the generation of one
environment in both cases. Answering the module checking question using a global
strategy requires the generation of all environments, which will be computationally
much more expensive than the local approach.
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Appendix
Example. Table 2 describes the steps involved in generating a witness environ-
ment for the coﬀee brewer example in Figure 1. First, the original CTL property
AGE (ttUTEN ∧AF (SERV E ∨ ERROR)) is negated (and the negation carried
inwards) to E(ttU AG¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)). The local module
checker is then called on the initial state (s0) of the model along with the negated
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s0|e0 |= {E(tt U AG¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR))}
s0|e0 |= {AG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)
∨ (tt ∧ EXE(tt U AG¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)))}
s0|e0 |= {AG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}
s0|e0 |= {¬TEN , AXAG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}
s1|e1 |= {AG(¬TEN ∨AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}
s1|e1 |= {¬TEN , AXAG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}
↙
s2|e2 OR s3|e3 OR s4|e4 OR s5|e5 |= {AG(¬TEN ∨AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}}
s2|e2 |= {AG(¬TEN ∨AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}} (s3, s4, s5 not explored)
s2|e2 |= {¬TEN , AXAG(¬TEN ∨AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}
↙
s6|e6 |= AG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)
s6|e6 |= ¬TEN ∧ AXAG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)
↙
s7|e7 |= AG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)
s7|e7 |= ¬TEN ∧AXAG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)
↙
s8|e8 AND s9|e9 |= {AG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}}
s8|e9 AND s9|e9 |= {¬TEN , AXAG(¬TEN ∨AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}
↙
s0|e0 |= {AG(¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR)}
Table 2
Tableau for constructing witness environment for the coﬀee brewer example in Figure 1
formula. The algorithm applies the appropriate tableau rules described earlier and
ﬁrst attempts to check if the current state satisﬁes all current-state commitments.
Then the next-state commitments are passed on to the successors.
For example, initially the negated property E(ttU AG¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧
¬ERROR)) is passed to the initial state s0 of the model. The negated prop-
erty is then broken down (using the environment state tableau rule unreu) to
{AG (¬TEN ∨ AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR) ∨ (tt ∧ EX EttU AG(¬TEN ∨
AG(¬SERV E ∧ ¬ERROR))). The resulting disjunction is then broken further
(using the tableau rule ∧). Once the current-state commitments are met, all next
state commitments of s0 are passed to its successor s1. This is shown using ↙ in
table 2. Note that for environment states, formulas are organized into set notation
whereas for system states, they are applied in the order they arrive. The algo-
rithm terminates when a strongly connected component which satisﬁes the negated
property is found.
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